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Abstract
1The paper reviews the importance of tuna fisheries in the western and central Pacific
Island Countries  (PICs) and examines whether  current and proposed economically
focussed institutional mechanisms, that underpin tuna management, are sufficient to
promote appropriate and long term tuna-led development.  Substantial potential gains
are shown to exist from co-operation in terms of tuna management, but it seems
highly unlikely such benefits will be realised in the short or medium term despite the
formation in 2004 of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Even if
gains from co-operation were to be realised, without substantial improvements in the
institutional quality and capacity of many PICs the tuna fisheries might still fail to
sustain the region’s long-term development. The study’s implications are that the twin
development priorities in the region should be support for social infrastructure,
especially capacity building to increase the effectiveness of the public sector, and the
promotion of co-operative approaches to ensure the sustainability and profitable use
of the region’s shared fishery resources.
Key words: sustainable development, Pacific Island Countries (PICs), tuna, resource
rents, governance
21. Introduction
The development challenges facing the countries of the southern central and western
Pacific Ocean (collectively Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia – or Pacific Island
Countries) are daunting despite substantial in flows of development assistance.1
Commonly recognised  problems include high rates of unemployment and
underemployment, low levels of economic growth and, in some countries, social unrest
and political instability (World Bank 2000a; Asian Development Bank 2004).  In the
forefront of the development agenda of many PICs is how to utilise the region’s natural
resources (fisheries, forests, tourist potential) to promote social and economic goals in a
manner that is sustainable.
In this paper, we focus on the western and central Pacific region’s highly prized fish
stocks found in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of PICs, and in the high seas in
between. Specifically, we evaluate some of the economic institutions of current tuna
management practices to show how tuna resources might be used to improve development
outcomes. In section two, we briefly sketch the importance of the tuna fisheries and the
extent to which PICs have been successful in pursuing tuna led development.  Section
three highlights the major challenges to co-operatively managing the tuna resources to
maximise the benefits to the island states. In particular, we examine whether the recent
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (hereafter the ‘Tuna Convention’) can deliver the
potential benefits of co-operation. In section four we examine other constraints, and in
particular the quality and capacity of public institutions, that prevent PICs from making
                                                          
1 Not including aid from France to New Caledonia and French Polynesia, total development assistance
is a little less than $100 per capita, although some countries receive substantially more than this
amount.
3the best use of the resource rents from their tuna fisheries. We conclude by proposing two
approaches that PICs, with assistance from donor countries, may wish to consider to
sustain the region’s development.
2. Tuna-led Development in Pacific Island Countries
Income levels in the Pacific region are low by world standards, although there is
substantial variability among countries. Table one indicates that only one country, Palau,
has an upper middle level of income, and all others fall in the lower half of the world’s
countries in terms of their Human Development Ranking (HDI)2. Some countries have
also experienced negative economic growth in the recent past, and many PICs have the
challenge of ensuring rising living standards in the face of rapid increases in population.
Although the 14 independent countries and the 8 dependent territories that constitute the
region have very small populations (only Papua New Guinea has a population greater than
one million) their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extend 200 nautical miles from land
and represent a huge area of the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 1). Not surprisingly, marine
resources are critically important to the well being of some PICs, especially those with a
large EEZ, a small population and a tiny land mass. In the case of the Federated States of
Micronesia, Tuvalu and Kiribati, the value of fish caught in their EEZs exceeds their gross
national income while in the Marshall Islands, Samoa and Solomon Islands it almost half
of their national income.  PICs, however, receive only a tiny faction of the benefits from
the fisheries found in their territories because about 90% of the fish caught in their EEZs is
                                                          
2 HDI is an index of life expectancy at birth, educational achievement (adult literacy and combined
gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment) and real per capita GDP.
4harvested by Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs), and these nations only pay
approximately 3-4% of the landed value in access fees (Petersen 2005).
The failure to fully realise the potential benefits from their fishery resources is of major
concern for PICs. Many thought that conferring of EEZs under the third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)3 would provide an economic ‘bonanza’. It
was hoped that fisheries would address two major challenges: one, reduce the risks of
overexploitation of a common-pool resource and two, provide the PICs with a reliable
source of income with which to finance economic development (Chand et al. 2003).
Whatever EEZs may have delivered to PICs, they have coincided with a substantial
increase in fishing effort and harvests. For instance, Figure 2 shows that the total harvest
of tuna has more than doubled since the 1980s, and the region now supplies about 40% of
the world’s global catch of tuna. The latest data suggests that catches of some tuna in the
region may have peaked, such as yellowfin tuna, and that some stocks, such as bigeye
tuna, may even be overexploited (Langley et al. 2005). Another worrying trend has been a
70% decline in the catch per unit of effort of yellow-fin tuna in the western Pacific over
the past 50 years, although the significance of this trend in terms of what it implies about
declines in tuna populations is disputed (Hampton et al. 2005; Myers and Worm, 2005).
Most tuna in the region are caught by large purse seiner vessels worth up to several million
dollars, and are almost exclusively owned and operated by DWFNs. Of the total landed
value of fish in the Western and Central Pacific, worth some US$ 2 billion, only about
US$60 million is paid in access fees to PICs (Gillett et al. 2001). These access fees are low
                                                          
3 The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention is a universal legal framework designed to manage
and conserve marine resources at the international level. It incorporates many different areas of marine
and ocean governance of which the granting of exclusive economic zones to coastal states and the
management of fisheries is just one part. It was finalised in 1982 and came into force in 1994.
5by comparison to those paid in other parts of the world (Chand et al. 2003; Inhedru 1995).
This, in part, is explained by the lack of bargaining power of PICs relative to DWFNs,
provisions imposed on DWFNS, such as transhipment of fish (Duncan and Temu 1997)
that reduce returns to fishing, the linking of development aid and assistance with access
fees, and because it appears that fishing effort is at a level that exceeds that which would
maximise the economic surplus (Bertignac et al. 2000).
2.1 Bargaining Power
Initial attempts by the PICs to obtain reasonable access to resource rents accruing from
their fisheries were hampered by their negotiation experiences with the Japanese, who in
the early 1980s harvested about three-quarters of the tuna stocks. Moreover, early
experiences of multilateralism in the 1970s in other areas, such as air transportation,
which have been less than successful (Fry 2005) have made some PICs reluctant to
collaborate and bargain as a group. This made it easier for the Japanese to manipulate
negotiations through a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy ― by refusing to negotiate with
PICs collectively that wished to do so, and ensuring that at least one access arrangement
to a EEZ was always in operation, they were able to keep PICs in competitive positions
with respect to each other (Schurman 1998). This strategy was enhanced by the fact that
the benefits and costs of implementing collective bargaining by PICs are likely to be
unevenly distributed, thus lowering the incentive to form co-operative arrangements.
It appears that PICs have become more adept in bargaining with DWFNs over time and
co-operation in discussions of access. For example, the formation of the Nauru, Palau and
FSM Agreements represent successful efforts at coordinating behaviour, although these
6agreements only explicitly cover licensing conditions. In addition, there is evidence that
the Nauru Group that consists of seven PICs that have the most to gain from a better
bargaining with DWFNs have improved access agreements and payoffs to Pacific states
(Munro et al. 2004). Over time the relative importance of the Japanese has also
diminished, (see Table 2) and increased access and competition by the Taiwanese,
Korean, Chinese and US fleets has also forced the Japanese to concede to more
reasonable access fees (Schurman 1998, Petersen 2005). Unfortunately, increased
harvests from the new entrants appear to also have reduced overall returns and the ability
of DWFNs to pay increased access fees.
2.2. Bundling of Aid and Fisheries Access
It is common practice in the Pacific for donors to bundle in-kind or financial development
assistance in the expectation that they will be favourably considered in negotiations over
access to resources and fees. Schurman (1998) cites the example of the National Fisheries
Corporation of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) receiving ‘gifts’ of training
boats, while the Asian Development Bank (ADB) observes that almost half of the ‘access
fees’ paid by US boats actually takes the form of development aid (ADB 1998). Given the
secretive nature of the bilateral access arrangements it is difficult to determine the extent
of this practice, but it does appear to have reduced the access fees paid to PICs.
2.3 Fostering a Domestic and Commercially Competitive Fishing Industry
A major strategy pursued by PICs to achieve the desired economic benefits from their
tuna fisheries has been ‘domestication’, or the process of developing and/or then
7integrating domestically located harvesting and processing sectors to serve export
markets. PICs have encouraged domestication through a two-pronged strategy of direct
public finance of national industrial enterprises, designed to grow a domestic tuna
industry, and by attaching industry development conditions on the licensing arrangements
for DWFNs. Typically, this second approach has seen PICs requiring foreign vessels to
utilise domestic infrastructure and/or nationals to crew boats, as well as maintaining and
completing compliance procedures such as those set out in the FSM Agreement.4
Unfortunately, these strategies have largely failed to bear fruit (Petersen 2002, 2005;
Schurman 1998; Chand et al.; van Santen and Muller 2000; ADB 1998), but some
benefits have been generated through direct and indirect employment in the tuna industry
and also foreign currency earnings (Barclay and Yoshikazu 2000; Gillett et al. 2001).
In general, PICs have chosen to focus on the harvesting sector in terms of their public
sector investment. Unfortunately, the harvesting of tuna generates highly variable
revenues, requires large upfront sunk costs and substantial technical requirements. The
high investment costs and the fickle nature of fishing has meant that mistakes have been
made that are financially burdensome for some PICs (ADB 1998).5  The lack of
appropriate technical skills domestically has also meant that PICs have often had to rely
on foreign investment partners to implement projects, or enter into partnerships with
foreign firms ― reducing the potential financial gains from projects.  Van Santen and
Muller (2000) summarise some of the investments made by three PICs (Federated States
of Micronesia, Fiji and Marshall Islands) in tuna harvesting totalling over US$70 million
                                                          
4 One compliance mechanism is the requirement to participate in a vessel monitoring system (VMS)
run by the Forum Fisheries Agency.   The VMS allows FFA members to track the location, speed and
direction of licensed boats operating in the EEZs of member countries (van Santen and Muller 2000).
5 The Asian Development Bank cites the following reasons why port development has not been a
successful strategy: fleet operators prefer to service vessels in the same ports where they service fish,
the later usually lying outside the WCPO Region, volatile access policies by PIC Governments,
8― a sum in excess of the region’s annual access fees. In general, these investments have
been made by the public sector and many have failed to yield a positive financial return
(Petersen 2005).
Equally as important is whether PICs could receive a greater amount from access fees
alone than a mix of access fees and an export-orientated domestic industry, assuming the
investment by PICs generates a positive rate of return. The answer depends on the relative
cost efficiency of DWFNs (Munro 1979). If DWFNs have lower harvesting costs, as
seems likely given their ability to profitably harvest tuna resources and pay access fees,
the potential economic surplus is greater than if PICs were to do the harvesting. This
possibility is illustrated in Figure 3 where PICs are shown to receive an even greater
return from only a 50% share of the resource rent at the economic optimum rate of
exploitation undertaken by DWFNs than simply harvesting tuna themselves at their own
economic optimum level of harvesting.
Another consideration for PICs, in terms of the domestication of their fishing industry, is
the very substantial cost associated with fisheries management. In a number of countries
outside of the region the costs of fisheries management exceed the potential benefits from
the fisheries (Schrank et al. 2003). This suggests that a ‘go-it-alone’ strategy in terms of
harvesting and managing tuna may be a costly exercise for PICs that may generate few, if
any, net benefits. The question for advocates of ‘domestication’ is, therefore, what should
be the nature of the partnerships between PICs and DWFNs that will maximise the
payoffs to the Pacific states.
                                                                                                                                                                     
variable and seasonal nature of resource making use of single ports impractical, poor port and other
services and concerns about law and order in some ports (ADB 1998).
93. Institutional Innovation in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Convention
Although some cooperation between PICs has been successful, it may be possible that
PICs could improve potential payoffs through further co-operation, particularly on
economic issues. These potential benefits follow on from the problems identified above:
one, better bargaining power in terms of access fees with DWFNs from the current mean
level of about 40% of the total rent,6 two, increased resource rent and greater population
resilience from moving to lower rates of exploitation that could more than double the
resource rent from the fisheries (Bertignac et al. 2000), three, higher returns from
harvesting older age classes of fish and mitigating the ‘race to fish’ and, four, reduced
management costs and increased monitoring from better co-ordination of enforcement
and surveillance activities.  Although potentially all countries, PICs and DWFNs, could
be made better off with co-operation that reduces current harvesting and directs it to older
age classes to raise the overall resource rent, obtaining such an agreement would require
that every country be at least as well off with co-operation. Moreover, there would be
significant transitional losses in moving to a lower harvest, but high fish stock
environment, and these costs would be unevenly distributed among DWFNS and PICs.
Thus to achieve an agreement some form of  ‘side-payments’ in terms of harvest rights or
monetary compensation would probably be required from the winners to the losers as
well incentives for all countries to comply with a co-operative agreement. It would also
require barriers to entry for new participants or countries that might also wish to benefit
from increased returns from co-operation.
                                                          
6 A ‘back of the envelope’ calculation of the proportion of the resource rent accruing to PICs is to take
the estimated total access fees paid of around US$60 million in 1999 (Gillett et al. 2001) and divide by
the estimated resource rent in 1996 of some US$160 million (Bertignac et al. 2000). Given the high
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Chand et al. (2003) propose a possible way to achieve a co-operative agreement by the
creation of a commission, composed of both PICs and DWFNs, that would allocate
harvesting rights as a percentage of a total allowable catch denominated by species and
area based on EEZs and historical fishing patterns. These harvesting rights would be
transferable and divisible between vessels flagged by the countries that are signatories to
the agreement. Other countries could enter the agreement, but would be required to buy or
lease harvesting rights to legally catch tuna in the region. Population assessments and
monitoring and enforcement would be paid for out of rentals based on the allocated
rights, and because of economies of size and scope, could significantly reduce overall
management costs. To give greater transparency as to the size of the resource rents in the
fisheries, Chand et al. (2003) recommend that a small percentage of the total rights held
by all countries would have to be tendered for sale every year and the prices for the rights
made available to all parties.
The objective of the recently ratified Convention on the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (hereafter the
‘Tuna Convention’) is to ensure, through management, the long term conservation and
sustainable use of highly migratory tuna stocks (WCPF Convention 2004). While
primarily a conservation oriented agreement, the opportunity to use the Convention as a
forum for economic cooperation could assist the PICs in addressing the tuna development
problems outlined in section two of this paper and also provide a critical incentive
mechanism to ensure that PICs (and DWFNs) continue to participate, and enforce, the
conservation aspects of this cooperative agreement.
                                                                                                                                                                     
risks associated with tuna harvesting it would be surprising if PICs were able to obtain, on a long-term
basis, more than half the available resource rent in the form of access fees.
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With the important exception of catch limits and allocation, analysis of the text of the
Convention suggests that the drafters have chosen not to pursue economic objectives.
Rather it appears that the PICs view the Convention as a measure to ensure management
compatibility between high seas and the management regimes already existing within
their EEZs (Ram-Bidesi and Tsamenyi 2004).
The Tuna Convention’s in-principle agreement to establish total allowable catches for
tuna at the regional level is a significant break from previous practices of controlling
catches through controlling fishing effort. Selection of an appropriate TAC could provide
a powerful mechanism to help guard against economic and ecological overfishing and
provide an institutional mechanism over which to focus regional cooperation and
dialogue.  However, the effectiveness of this component may be undermined by the
process adopted for its implementation. Rather than establishing a process similar to the
one outlined in Chand et al (2003) for determining TAC, the Convention has  charged the
secretariat body to the Convention (the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission) with responsibility to coordinate a  mechanism whereby TACs are set by
consensus amongst signatories. In the list of factors the Tuna Convention has specified
must be ‘taken into account’, the setting of TACs to maximise the economic yield or
surplus from fishing is conspicuously absent. Predictably, this has already created fierce
debate of competing models of fisheries allocation (Ram-Bidesi and Tsamenyi 2004) and
any benefits from the Tuna Convention as a whole is limited until these debates are
resolved. Aside from the TAC issue, an analysis of the Tuna Convention’s text
demonstrates that it is poorly equipped to deal with any other economic issues and there
are significant institutional ‘gaps’ in the management framework proposed by he Tuna
Convention.
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Table 3 summarises key results of the Tuna Convention. A major deficiency is that it does
little to help PICs work co-operatively to maximise resource rents at a sustainable level.
Moreover, the Tuna Convention does not prevent the PICs from attaching conditions to
access and licensing arrangements similar to those set out in the Nauru, Palau and FSM
arrangements. Thus the Tuna Convention is a treaty about the amount of fish to be caught
― rather than about helping PICs overcome their development issues through better use
of their tuna resources.
Nevertheless, the Tuna Convention’s entry into force as a body of international law
represents an impressive development: it is a genuine multilateral regime that includes all
PICs and allows for, and encourages, the membership by DWFNs.7 It also explicitly
recognises the importance of sustainability, ecosystem management and
interdependencies of tuna management, something which was envisaged, but until now an
unimplemented, component of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.8
As with any international treaty, the effectiveness of the Tuna Convention and its
supporting secretariat, the Fisheries Commission, is limited by the political will of the
member countries and the economic resources that they make available to undertake its
mandate. The Fisheries Commission will be another organisation, along with the
                                                          
7 As of March 2005, the republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei are the only members that are distant
water fishing nations.
8 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks  (the “UN Fish Stocks Agreement”) sets
out principles for the conservation and management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks
existing in both international waters and EEZs. Key principles in this agreement include: a
precautionary approach, cooperation amongst stakeholders and  consistency in management across
national/international boundaries. The Treaty envisaged that regional agreements would be established
to act as the regional operational framework. The Western and Central Pacific Ocean Convention is the
regional agreement corresponding to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. (United Nations 2004).
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Secretariat of the South Pacific Community (SPC) located in New Caledonia and  the
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) based in the Solomon Islands that will provide support
for fisheries management. It is not clear to what responsibilities will be divided among
the organisations, the level of co-ordination between the three organisations, and to what
extent, if any, resources will be shared in terms of fisheries management. Thus although
the FFA was recently awarded US$ 11 million over five years from the Global
Environment Facility to support fisheries management in the Pacific (Forum Fisheries
Agency 2005), the allocated budget of less than US$ 1 million for the 2005 operations of
the Fisheries Commission is a matter of concern (Fisheries Commission 2004).
4. Tuna and governance in Pacific Island Countries: the potential for a resource
curse?
The ADB identifies four key principles to good governance: accountability, participation,
predictability and transparency (ADB 2004). The inability of PICs to promote and
implement these principles is generally recognised as one of the key factors underscoring
poor socio-economic performance across the Pacific (ADB 2004). Indeed, some
observers argue that poor governance and poor institutional quality is the major barrier to
the future development prospects for PICs.9
Root causes of poor governance lie in a complex mixture of socio-cultural and historical
factors. In part, these arise from the interplay between western and traditional Pacific
cultures and the colonial history of much of the region (Salandha 2002).  Poor
institutional performance is also linked to lack of suitably qualified people able ― and
                                                          
9 AusAid Country Programmes: Pacific http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/southpacific.cfm.
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willing ― to address governance issues (ADB 2004). It is most strongly expressed in the
poor quality of the national based public institutions ― political instability, weak
parliamentary systems, corruption, a politicised public service, and a failure to establish
strong institutions of governance (such as auditors or ombudsman).
Figures 3 and 4 provide estimates of the ability of PICs to control corruption and a
measure of government effectiveness in 2004. For comparison purposes, the estimated
levels for Australia and New Zealand are also illustrated. Both figures place most PICs in
the lower half of world rankings with some countries, such as the Solomon Islands and
Papua New Guinea, listed in the lowest decile of countries.
While poor quality institutions and governance structures are critical factors in explaining
the historically poor economic performance of tuna fisheries (Chand et al. 2003; Petersen
2002; Petersen 2005; ADB 1998; Schurman 1998; Hinds 2003), it is difficult to pinpoint
any direct causal relationship, other than one of influence. Poor institutions and
governance practices are pervasive rather than being specific to tuna management itself,
and thus poor management in the fisheries is a symptom rather than a driver of poor
economic performance.  Moreover, the evidence relating to poor governance as it directly
affects tuna management tends to be anecdotal ― although it is possible to make some
general observations.
First, the historical approach of setting access conditions and fees is both non-transparent
and non-participatory. A secret agreement between national governments makes it
extremely difficult for analysts, or the Pacific communities themselves, to identify
whether these common-pool tuna resources are being used in the most efficient manner.
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This is reinforced by the (explicit or implicit) bundling of donor assistance with access
― although the provision of aid is of benefit to the PIC in question, it is impossible to
determine whether the combination of fees and aid represents the best economic outcome
that could be derived from scarce tuna resources (Petersen 2005). This tendency towards
‘bundling’ is reinforced by the traditional and governance cultures pervasive in the
Pacific: the traditional familial links between politicians and their communities and the
expectations that these connections deliver financial benefits.
Petersen (2002) also highlights the importance of governance in stimulating private sector
participation in the tuna fisheries. Here again, poor governance and inappropriate
economic policy settings appear to have failed to stimulate extensive private sector
participation in the fisheries. Evidence of this is anecdotal for specific tuna fisheries
across the region because the failure to develop a viable private sector is a general, rather
than a tuna specific, issue.  For example, Gillett et al. (2001) discuss the Papua New
Guinea National Fisheries Authority, which, it is claimed, has insufficient internal and
external controls applied, obscure licensing processes which are subject to manipulation,
poor record keeping, mismanagement of trust accounts, and extensive use of influence
rather than merit to determine management decisions.
4.1 Potential for a resource Curse
Over the longer term, even with the successful implementation of the Tuna Convention,
tuna-led development represents more governance challenges to the PICs.  If Pacific
Island states are able to increase their access fees this has the potential, in the absence of
strong institutions, to generate a ‘resource curse’ (Auty 2001; Sachs and Warner 2000) for
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some countries. PICs require capital to promote their economic development, but in the
absence of good governance these funds could contribute to political, economic and
social problems ― difficulties that have arisen elsewhere with resource rich developing
countries.
The potential for a ‘resource curse’ phenomenon to become established due to a resource
boom is real: both PNG and Nauru have experienced the resource boom-bust cycle to
various degrees. However, until recently, the potential for a resource curse phenomenon
from fisheries in the Pacific region, and its potential consequences, has been largely
ignored.
Resource booms may have both positive and negative consequences on the socio-
economic milieu of resource rich countries. The processes by which resource rents
ultimately lead to negative consequences are often referred to as ‘transmission’
mechanisms, and usually include phenomena such as declines in the non-resource export
sector, crowding out effects, poor decision making at the government level, and a decline
in the quality of institutions. Unfortunately, it is possible to discern many of the typical
‘transmittal’ dynamics in existence in the Pacific.  For example, corruption is key in
spreading the impacts of the resource curse, and is also an unfortunate feature of some
public institutions in the region.
Table 4 provides a comparison of institutional quality and the potential risk factors for
PICs to develop a ‘resource curse’. The data set out in columns A and B provide some
information about how each PIC government has formal structures in guarding against
poor governance  ― namely accountability mechanisms and independence of the
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judiciary. Column C shows another important mechanism of promoting good governance
― whether communities are active in monitoring government performance in service
delivery. Column D tracks whether PIC governments have put into place ‘anti-corruption’
strategies and column E records whether conflict, often seen as a long-term consequence
of poor governance, has actually occurred in the PIC. Overall, columns A – E record
information on the general health of governance in the PICs.
Columns F – I in Table 4 records the extent to which the fish caught in the EEZs of PICs
might affect overall economic performance. Given the previous performance of
government led investments, it is reasonable to argue that the greater the size of the
government sector in the economy and the less diverse is the economy, the more
vulnerable it is to a resource curse, in the absence of good institutional quality.  As shown
in column G, the size of the fisheries resource within the EEZs of some Pacific states is
very large indeed. For example, in the case of Kiribati and Tuvalu the value of fish caught
exceeds the countries’ GDP.  The potential for the resource curse may be further
reinforced, the greater the relative amount of aid that is received from DWFNs seeking
licence arrangements with a PIC, as presented in column H. The final column, gross
fishing revenues in a PIC’s EEZ, provides an indication of the absolute size of fishery
resources.   Although there is substantial variability among countries, Table 4 indicates a
very real potential of a resource curse.
4.2 Avoiding the Curse
The overall indications are that PICs are at real risk of misusing both existing and future
returns that they may accrue from their fisheries resources. This suggests that a major
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development focus should be to improve the quality of institutions and governance in the
western and central Pacific. In other words, simply ensuring sustainable and economically
profitable tuna fisheries is unlikely to be sufficient to bring about sustained development.
A successful example of managing fisheries and their revenues is provided by the
Falkland Islands Government (FIG) which suggests that very large fisheries revenues, if
used wisely, can provide substantial social and economic benefits (Thomas 2002). For
instance, the FIG has been able to extract substantial access fess while also ensuring the
monitoring, data collection, surveys and analysis of catch and abundance data to
sustainably manage the resources (Falkland Islands Government  2005).
In addition to supporting capacity and institutional development, PICs and donors could
develop ‘trust funds’ which would be managed separately from other government
revenues. The money in the trust funds would be independently managed and audited and
any expenditure from the fund, beyond a pre-determined level, would be prohibited
without an act of parliament or legislation.  It would also be possible to specify the sort of
expenditures (such as physical infrastructure) that would be permitted from the fund.
Trust funds cannot substitute for good quality institutions, but can provide greater
transparency in terms of both fishing revenues and expenditures. A trust fund could also
provide a sustainable revenue stream for both present and future generations. The
successful use of a trust fund by Kiribati for its phosphate royalties, which has generated
returns long after mining ceased (Petersen 2005), suggests that similar funds should be
seriously considered by PICs in terms of fishery access fees.
5. Conclusions
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The countries and the territories of the western and central Pacific face formidable
challenges to promote their development. Their shared fisheries resources, and in
particular tuna, provide the possibility for ‘tuna-led’ economic development for some
states. The ability for the fishery resources to assist Pacific Island countries is, however,
constrained by economic overfishing, the inability to deter new entrants and fishing
effort, and failed strategies to develop a profitable domestic, but export-orientated,
industry. The countries of the region also face problems with corruption and government
effectiveness that pose real risks that fishing revenues will not generate a sustainable flow
of income to sustain the region’s long-term development.
To address these problems, both Pacific Island countries and donor nations should
consider a twin strategy to maximise the development potential of the region’s fishery
resources. First, given the potential for co-operation to make every stake holder better off,
including distant water fishing nations, greater efforts should be directed at devising and
supporting multinational institutions that reduce harvests, increase the transparency of
access fee arrangements, and allow for transferability of harvesting rights across countries
and vessels. Second, to ensure the most effective use of funds generated from fishing
resources, greater attention should be given to increasing capacity in the public sector,
improving government effectiveness. This could include, but should not be limited to,
developing innovative ways to reduce corruption and the possible misuse of public
revenues by the creation of trust funds for fishing access fees. Both strategies, if
successful, offer the real possibility to promote tuna-led sustainable development in the
Pacific.
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Figure One: Map of Western and Central Pacific Region
Source: Secretariat of the Pacific Community.
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 Control of Corruption - 2004
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Key: Control of corruption measures perceptions of corruption in terms of using
public power for private gain. Chosen comparator is the year 2000. All scores are
normalised to be between –3 and 3.0 where a higher score indicates greater control of
corruption. Confidence intervals are denoted by the upper and lower bars for each
country.
Figure 4: Measure of the Control of Corruption for Selected Pacific Island
Countries.
Source:  Kaufmann et al. (2005) and authors’ calculations.
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Government Effectiveness- 2004
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Key: Government effectiveness combines measures of quality of public service,
provision, quality of bureaucracy, competence and independence of the civil service
and credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. Confidence intervals are
denoted by the upper and lower bars for each country.
Figure 5: Measure of Government Effectiveness for Selected Pacific Island
Countries
Source:  Kaufmann et al. (2005) and authors’ calculations.
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Table One: Development and Fishery Statistics of Selected Pacific Island
Countries
Country Population
(2001 in
thousands)
Annual
Population
Growth
(1990-98)
GNI
Per
capita
(US$
2001)
Mean
Gross
Fisheries
Revenues
1993-98
as %
GNI
2001
Adult
Literacy
Life
Expectancy
at birth
Global
HDI
Rank
FSM 120 2.1 2,150 215% 71.3 65.7 120
Fiji 824 0.9 2,130 0% 92.9 66.6 101
Kiribati 93 2.1 830 503% 92.2 61.6 129
Marshall
Islands
53 3.6 2,190 85% 74.4 65 121
Palau 20 2.4 6,730 5% 91.4 69 46
Tonga 101 0.3 1.530 0% 99.0 68 107
Samoa 171 1.2 1,520 6% 95.7 66.6 117
Solomon
Islands
432 3.3 580 87% 30.3 64.7 147
Vanuatu 203 2.7 1,050 0% 33.5 65.8 140
Notes: 1. FSM = Federate States of Micronesia. 2. GNI = Gross National Income
Source: World Bank (2000a), World Bank (2003), Petersen (2005) and authors’
calculations.
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Table 2: Average Annual Tuna Catches in the Western and Central Pacific
Region for Selected Countries
Country Estimated Catch (average 2000-2003)
Japan 225,567
Taiwan 282,458
Korea 190,761
USA 97,422
Solomon Islands 19,063
Vanuatu 9,593
Papua New Guinea 112,098
Federated States of Micronesia 22,747
Australia 1,892
Total 961,599
Source: FAO (2005) and authors’ calculations.
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Table 3 Selected Features of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna
Convention with Comments
Desirable Features of a
Convention
Features of the WCPO Tuna Convention
Well defined property rights and system of
and agreeing to and distributing ‘entitlements’
over common-pool resources
Rights exist at national level, but are not well defined at the fisher level.
Direct link between resource
ownership/control and economic return
No
Clear mechanisms for dispute resolution
between Convention members and between
members and non-members/other convention
areas.
No ― some procedures are set out covering potential disputes with non-
parties to the Convention, but these are weak and rely on diplomatic
pressure.
Mechanisms to prevent further entry into the
fisheries
No
Mechanisms to prevent economic overfishing Not a management objective or criteria for setting TACs.
Mechanisms to address social and
environmental externalities
In theory, yes, as environmental and social externalities form part of the
list of issues ‘taken into account’ in managing and conserving fish stocks.
However, exact mechanisms to account for these issues are not defined.
Clear decision making procedures established.
Decision making processes are transparent
and open to scrutiny by third parties
Yes ― decisions made in the first place by consensus. If not achieved,
then decisions made by voting. Voting parties divided into two
‘chambers’ – those who are members of the FFA and those who are not.
Article 21 allows for participation of third parties where appropriate, as a
mechanism to promote transparency.
Mechanisms to ensure compliance with
Convention goals and targets
Enforcement of provisions of convention on fishing vessels lie with flag
state. Sanctions may be used to enforce compliance by flag states in the
event of vessel non-compliance. Convention also establishes a regional
observer programme to promote compliance. No provisions to enforce
member states to translate provisions in Convention into national laws.
Convention supports develops the capacity of
member countries to implement Convention
goals
In theory, yes, – article 30 recognises the ‘special needs’ of developing
country members and provides for financial, technical and other assistance
as appropriate. Current budget, however, precludes such capacity
development.
Secretariat is adequately resourced No. The Fisheries Commission is under resourced by several orders of
magnitude (< $US 1 million in 2005).
Table 4 Measures of Institutional Quality and Potential for Misuse of Fisheries Revenues in the Western and Central Pacific
A B C D E F G H I
Ratio of value of fish
harvested to overall
economic performancevii
Existence of
external
accountability
mechanism for
governmenti
Independence
of judiciary ii
Existence of
active
citizens
groups?iii
Existence and
implementation of
an ‘anti-
corruption’
strategy? iv
Existence of
conflict or other
law and order
problems in the
last 10 yearsv
Government
expenditure as
a percentage of
GDP (average
1990-2002)vi Exports
GDP
Amount of
development
assistance
received from
top four
DWFNsviii
Gross Fisheries
Revenues ($US
million, average
1993-1999)
Cook Islands
Independent audit
office – but under
resourced.
Ombudsman exists Independent
Yes – large
focus on
corruption
activities by
government
Cook Islands Anti-
Corruption Action Plan
adopted by Cabinet in
2001 No 44%
0.08
(0.05-0.11)
<0.01
(0.0 – 0.01) 0.15 0.6
Fiji Islands
Independent audit
office.
Ombudsperson
exists and is
independent Independent
Yes – military
coups occurred in
1987 and 2000 29%
0.01
(<0.01-0.01)
<0.01
(<0.01) 22.6 9.1
Kiribati
Auditor
independent, but
poorly resourced
and poor follow up.
No ombudsman. Independent
No, but
members of
parliament can
and often raises
issues about
service delivery
on behalf of
their
constituents. No No 117% N/A
2.29
(1.62 – 3.2) 7.2 392.4
Marshall Islands
Independent
auditor but under
resourced.  No
ombudsman Independent
No – but local
governments
active in this
area.
Not explicitly. Some
measures have been
implemented but with
no timetable for
completion. No 91%
5.81
(4.11-8.14)
0.47
(0.33-0.66) 52.61 98.5
Micronesia, Fed.
States of N/A N/A N/A N/A No 82%
131.53
(93.07-184.3)
1.24
(0.88-1.74) 109.42 557.4
Nauru
Audit Office
independence not
enshrined in
legislation.  No
ombudsman.
Independent but
this is not
constitutionally
guaranteed. No
No overall strategy but
some related
commitments made –
no timetable.
No civil conflict,
but significant
political instability
in recent years N/A N/A N/A 0.22 122.7
Palau
Independent
auditor. No
ombudsman exists. Independent No No. No 68% N/A N/A 27.71 7.0
Papua New
Guinea
Auditor
independent, but
poorly resourced.
Independent
ombudsman.
Independent –
but
appointments
‘raises
eyebrows’. Yes
Yes, a bill to establish
an ICAC is before
parliament.
Yes ― significant
political instability
including civil
conflict over
resources on
Bougainville
Island 32%
0.10
(0.07-0.14)
0.05
(0.04-0.07) 20 408.4
Samoa
Independent,
although proposed
changes could
undermine this.
Independent
ombudsman Independent
No.
Government
departments
must publish
‘service
charters’ by end
2003.
Not specifically, but
related measures are
incorporated within
broader public sector
reform. No 44%
0.44
(0.31-0.61)
0.4
(0.03-0.06) 14.7 16.6
Solomon Islands
Independent
auditor but
inadequately
resourced.
Independent
ombudsman but
currently non-
operating due to
lack of resources. Independent
Yes, the NGO
Solomon Island
Development
Trust monitors
government
performance. No
Yes  ― civil
unrest through
1998-2000 33%
0.82
(0.58-1.14)
0.32
(0.23-0.45) 1.4 217.9
7.1
Tonga In legislation –
however, auditor
reports to PM and
is inadequately
resourced.
Ombudsman exists
but has little
profile.
Independent Not really –
some groups
act as lobby
groups for
particular areas.
No strategy, but has
developed an
Economic and Public
Sector Reform
Programme in 2002 to
address some of the
relevant issues.
No 34% 0.04
(0.03-0.06)
<0.1
(<0.01)
0.9
Tuvalu
Independent
auditor but under-
resourced.  No
ombudsman Independent No
No, but is examining
related issues in the
context of developing
a ‘leadership code’. No 117% N/A
4.05
(2.87 – 5.67) 5.36 120.1
Vanuatu
Independent audit
office but under
resourced.
Ombudsman exists
and is independent.
Independent at
higher levels.
Some concern
about suitability
of appointments
and
effectiveness in
lower level
courts. No
A Comprehensive
Reform Programme
was established 1997
to address these issues.
No recent civil
conflict, but some
political instability 28%
0.01
(<0.01 – 0.01)
<0.01
(<0.01) 3.6 0.3
                                                          
i Transparency International (2004) various country reports.
ii Transparency International (2004) various country reports.
iii Transparency International (2004) National Integrity Reports, various countries. Information here summarises answer to question in the Report: Are their citizen’s groups
actively monitoring government’s performance in areas of service delivery?
iv Transparency International (2004) National Integrity Reports, various countries. Information here summarises answer to question in the Report: Has the government
announced an anti-corruption strategy and a timetable for implementation?
v Source: Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country, economy and regional information website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/ accessed: 26 May
2005.
vi Source: Asian Development Bank (2004). http://www.adb.org/statistics accessed 6 June 2005.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
vii Source: Authors own calculations determined as follows. Data for quantity of total fish harvested in each EEZ was multiplied by a weighted average estimate of price per
tonne ($US) to estimate total value of fish harvested by all fleets operating within that EEZ. The total value was then compared to the value of exports and the value of GNP.
Variations in price (US$990 and US$1960) were also calculated to illustrate a range of possible outcomes. These outcomes are reflected as a range in brackets. Harvest data from
Gillett et al (1999) for the year 1999.  Price data for the year 2000 from van Santen and Muller (2000). Export and GNP data (for 1999) from ADB (2001).
viii These DWFNs are: Japan, Korea, Taiwan and United States. Development assistance only recorded if donor is within the top 10 of donors to the recipient country. Source:
Source: OECD (2005) Aid statistics, Aid recipient Charts http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/recipientcharts accessed: 26 May 2005.
